The Caucasus has once again found itself looking on with increasing concern as yet another war has erupted bordering our region. When I started writing this newsletter yesterday, it lead with this line — ‘So far, with the US–Israel war against Iran into its sixth day, there has been no direct spillover effects onto either the South or North Caucasus, besides a relatively modest (as of now) influx of refugees into Armenia and Azerbaijan’.
Just one day later, this is no longer the case, as we watch videos of Iranian drones striking Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, injuring at least two people.
The war has shown no signs of slowing down, and despite the mile-a-minute flip-flopping from the Trump administration that is painfully in over its head, the conflict does appear to be barreling towards a change in the status quo for Iran — if not full-on regime change.
If this occurs, even if Iran just sheds its aggressively anti-Western regime in favour of a more ‘normal’ authoritarian government akin to Turkey, the ramifications will fundamentally alter the power dynamics of the Caucasus. Judging by the overly cautious and seemingly intentionally vague statements from the governments of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (at least before Thursday), the prospects of a change from the more or less comfortable status quo in Iran is raising concern, rather than hope, in the region’s capitals. This is particularly true for Yerevan and Baku.
Assuming the maximalist goals of Israel and the US come to fruition — the full collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran — the impacts on Armenia and Azerbaijan will depend on what comes next; if the situation devolves into civil war and partition, or if some force can consolidate power à la al-Sharaa in Syria after the fall of al-Assad.
Outright civil conflict raises the possibility of a large flow of refugees into both countries, as well as risks of mass casualties of civilians, a figure that could include the many ethnic Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians who live in Iran.
Already, we have seen reports that the US, keen to offload the real likelihood of casualties on local ‘partners’, will try to arm Iran’s Kurds and encourage them to take on the country’s more-than-capable security forces. Beyond the cynical nature of this plan (if we can call it that) there are many questions about how this would actually work on the ground, even if it does succeed.
Turkey is unlikely to want a Kurdish military force just across the border, and Iran’s patchwork of other ethnic minorities, including the sizable Azerbaijani community (the largest minority group), may want to carve out some kind of autonomy of their own. Azerbaijan may feel compelled to act in support of its ethnic brethren, or at the very least beef up its border security — already, Azerbaijan has reportedly moved troops to its border. This is something Armenia would want as well, and there are already unfounded rumours being spread that Turkey may try to occupy northwestern Iran, where the bulk of the Azerbaijani population lives.
To be clear, this is all speculation, but I think it serves to illustrate the risks posed by Trump–Netanyahu’s slapdash war plans.
Let’s imagine a second scenario, also in line with what the US and Israel want — a Venezuela-type scenario, in which the figureheads are removed in favour of a largely unchanged regime, at least domestically, but one that is more amenable to the West.
This too could pose risks for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but more from a geopolitical perspective. A pro-Western Iran would dramatically erode the delicate position Azerbaijan has carefully built for itself over recent decades as a regional player — one with good relations with Israel and offering a stable supply of fossil fuels. For Armenia, this would likely have fewer negative consequences, but would similarly make its place as a part of the Middle Corridor less relevant.
I can’t pretend to know or even begin to predict if any of these scenarios will come to pass. We are very much in the beginning stages of a conflict that looks difficult to contain, and even if a ceasefire is reached, it is unlikely the underlying causes for Israel and the US will be addressed, making another outbreak of fighting possible.
Of course, lost in all of this, are the Iranian people. Despite the half-hearted assurances, the notion that Trump and Netanyahu — or the Iranian regime — care about what happens to the citizens of Iran does not pass the smell test. After all, the Venezuela-scenario Trump said he wants would mean the ingrained authoritarianism would not disappear. In any case, the US and Israel are looking out for themselves, and are not really interested in what happens to Iran, so long as it does not continue to pose a threat to their countries.
But for the Caucasus, sharing a border with Iran and its some-90 million inhabitants, what happens does matter, and the governments in the region do not have the luxury of simply watching from a distance if Iran falls apart. We can already see the spillover effects on Thursday, with news of the Iranian strikes on Azerbaijan. Shortly after, Azerbaijan said it ‘reserves the right to take appropriate retaliatory measures’. We await nervously what this means in practice, and if Iran’s strikes will continue.
There are, however, some glimmers of a possible future that may not be all doom and gloom. A democratic Iran would of course be good for its own citizens, but it would also be good for a region full of authoritarian governments and weakening democracies. Reducing Azerbaijan’s strategic position in the region may lessen the West’s willingness to overlook its authoritarianism, thereby possibly loosening Aliyev’s grip on power.
Nonetheless, this will not be a walk in the park for the Caucasus to navigate, and there’s plenty that could go wrong.
As always, we will do our best to keep you updated on how this impacts the region, as well as giving you our analysis.
