Faith, resistance, and digital advocacy: NIYSO’s role in Chechen activism

In Chechnya, where local media operates under strict surveillance, digital platforms such as Telegram provide an alternative space to document social, political, and human realities. Whether it be resident testimonies, critiques of government policies, or reports of abuses and disappearances — Chechen e-activism has seen considerable growth over the past five years.

On 24 August 2022, activists of 1ADAT — a prominent opposition Telegram channel led by Ibragim Yangulbaev — announced the creation of their own movement, NIYSO (meaning ‘justice’ in Chechen). The movement defines itself as a jamaat, an Islamic congregation governed by a council (shuraa), which elects an emir to lead it.

Over the past two years, NIYSO has grown significantly, both in terms of its audience, reaching more than 26,500 followers on Telegram by December  2024, and in its structure and organisation. Though relatively new as a group, many of NIYSO’s members have a long and storied history of activism in Chechnya, and in resisting Russian rule.

From a denunciation movement to a political organisation

When NIYSO emerged as a digital political opposition with the characteristics of a traditional jamaat, it initially lacked a clear political programme. NIYSO’s public activities focused at the beginning on three main areas of activism: denouncing and criticising the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov, commenting on current events in Chechnya, and publishing anonymous messages from residents of the region.

However, in November 2023, NIYSO published its De-occupation Programme, which outlines its political ambitions and identifies four stages ‘on the path to de-occupation’, beginning with determining leadership and defining alliances.

Stage two, which NIYSO is currently operating on, focuses on mobilising and preparing society by creating media resources and disseminating information, including Islamic knowledge. As part of its efforts to create media resources, NIYSO also runs a YouTube channel with almost 40,000 subscribers and over 650 videos published.

In addition, NIYSO has focused on international outreach, including the creation of an English-language branch that publishes on Telegram and X.

The third stage is military resistance, including both fighting as well as hybrid methods such as economic sabotage and digital attacks, while the fourth and final stage addresses the recognition of Chechnya’s independence and efforts to secure the release of Chechen prisoners.

NIYSO’s official programme concludes with a statement asserting that the organisation does not claim to represent all Chechens nor present itself as an alternative government — a criticism often leveled at Akhmad Zakayev’s government-in-exile, which operates symbolically, advocating for Chechen independence, human rights, and opposition to Kadyrov.

In its publications, NIYSO also emphasises that portraying a movement whose goal is to ‘de-occupy Chechnya’ as merely enemies of Kadyrov is reductive.

Aslan, a NIYSO administrator, referred to by a pseudonym, tells OC Media that this narrative likely stems from the ‘Chechenisation’ of the conflict, which refers to the delegation of law enforcement functions to Chechen forces loyal to the federal government, with the aim of ensuring the republic’s reintegration and lasting anchoring within the Russian Federation following the two wars of 1994–1996 and 1999–2009.

‘They [Russia] actually want everyone to see this as a battle between Kadyrov and some Chechens who are unhappy with him. But the reality is that, even though we mainly discuss Kadyrov, we are opposing the Russian regime and the occupation’, Aslan tells OC Media.

NIYSO’s efforts to deconstruct such narratives are reflected in their careful choice of words. For instance, the term ‘Kadyrovtsy’ is replaced with ‘Russian employees’ when referring to security forces.

Challenging Kadyrov’s religious dogma

From the beginning, NIYSO has stated that their work would strictly adhere to Islamic law (Sharia). In its early months, NIYSO sought to differentiate itself from the dominant political opposition groups in the Chechen diaspora by emphasising the importance of religion in the fight for independence.

Among the key figures of the movement are Chechen imams living abroad, such as Said Ali Varando and Abdul-Vahid Alaro, whose religious legitimacy enables them to produce video content which refutes the religious arguments used by Kadyrov. Their faces have become representative of NIYSO’s religious department.

‘When the Kadyrovites or the people back home connect NIYSO to individuals, these are the people that it’s connected to’, Muhammad, a NIYSO channel administrator, referred to with a pseudonym, says.

In comparison, the main administrators of the channel — Ansar and Abu Zaid — are only known by name.

‘If they find it beneficial, they will show their faces, but at the moment they feel as if it is still unnecessary, however from the religious department, we can see that it’s a bit different where showing one’s face would be better for legitimacy’, Muhammad says.

NIYSO places significant emphasis on the religious dimension of its political opposition to Russia. For example, they often republish videos featuring short Islamic reminders in the Chechen language, noting that the Dawah, or the call to Islam, is more impactful in someone’s mother tongue.

Typically less than a minute long, these videos aim to highlight practices in Chechnya that NIYSO argues are haram (forbidden in Islam) by providing commentary and religious reasoning.

They also frequently challenge the Sufi doctrine prominent in the republic, labeling many practices as bid’a (innovative) and therefore impermissible according to Islamic teachings.

Sufism, a mystical branch of Islam emphasising spiritual connection with God through rituals, prayer, and devotion to saints, has deep historical roots in Chechnya.

Under Kadyrov, Sufism was rehabilitated, becoming Chechnya’s ‘national religion’ and ‘one of the pillars of the Kadyrov clan’s power’. By institutionalising Sufism, Kadyrov has sought to legitimise his regime and distinguish it from more conservative or reformist Islamic interpretations, often labelled as ‘Wahhabism’ or ‘extremism’.

‘They [NIYSO] stand for something rooted in our culture and faith’, explains Fatima, a supporter based in Belgium whose name was changed at her request. ‘For many in the diaspora, NIYSO offers a way to reconnect with our heritage and identity’.

Islamic videos shared by NIYSO not only criticise the dogma, they also denounce events and practices organised in Chechnya that they argue stray from orthodox  Islamic teachings, such as the widespread use of music, and celebrations like Christmas and New Year’s, which they claim have no foundation in Islamic tradition.

By framing these cultural and religious practices as haram, NIYSO positions itself as a defender of ‘the right path’ in contrast to what it views as a corrupt and politically motivated religious framework supported by Kadyrov.

However, not all members of the diaspora share this perspective. Some critics, particularly women, have expressed concerns about the platform’s ideological stance. There is apprehension that NIYSO’s vision for Chechnya might not align with the diverse aspirations of the diaspora.

‘They are too extreme’, Seda, a 22-year-old university student in France who requested the use of a pseudonym, says. ‘They raise awareness effectively, but their approach might replace one form of control with another’.

Gathering voices to document reality

Between 1 June and 20 November 2024, NIYSO shared over 180 messages purported to be from Chechen residents.

Publishing these messages may serve two purposes: firstly, informing the public about the situation in Chechnya as experienced by its residents, making them primary sources indispensable for tracking the region’s developments, and secondly, drawing attention to and seeking changes in Chechens’ daily lives.

Some anonymous messages highlight everyday issues, such as regular water and electricity outages in certain villages.

‘I can tell you, regarding the issues about water, heat, and electricity — none of these issues ever get resolved. This has been an ongoing cycle since the end of the second war, where all of these necessities are cut off again and again, even in the capital city of Grozny’,  Muhammad tells OC Media.

Other anonymous messages report the disappearance of relatives, allegedly abducted by Kadyrov’s forces. These calls for help aim to protect the victims from potential abuse.

‘The work NIYSO is doing tends to have a direct response from the Kadyrov regime. For example, NIYSO will make a post about a certain individual within the Kadyrovite ranks who had a fallout. So we’d have a post about their disappearance and their torture, and days later, the regime will make a propaganda video as a response to show this individual is actually “fine” ’, Muhammad says.

In October 2024 alone, more than 42 abductions were reported to NIYSO and subsequently shared on their Telegram channel.

The circumstances and motives behind these disappearances are not always disclosed. However, some are directly linked to suspicions of opposition activity. While the internet and social media are key tools for opposition movements to reach Chechens in Chechnya, this e-activism faces significant security challenges for both activists and members of the public.

The relocation of opposition activities beyond the country’s physical borders does not eliminate the regime’s pressure and threats. The 2021 Freedom House report Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach highlights four methods of transnational repression: direct physical attacks; misuse of legal tools, such as international arrest warrants; mobility restrictions, including passport cancellations; and remote threats via the internet or targeting relatives in their home country.

It is clear that Kadyrov’s power of intimidation does not stop at the borders of the republic. While threats are common in opposition circles, some cases go further, involving assassinations in the heart of Europe.

Transnational repression and the pressure exerted on the families of opponents who remain in Chechnya represent a major obstacle to the development of opposition movements. Fearful of repercussions, particularly against their relatives, many Chechens living in Europe prefer not to engage in political opposition movements, or act anonymously.

Chechen security forces ‘threaten to kill’ families of Telegram channel admins

Chechen security forces have reportedly visited and threatened to murder the relatives of individuals associated with the NIYSO Telegram channel, shortly after Kadyrov announced a crackdown on critics of the government. A representative of the team behind the channel told RFE/RL that the security…

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To fight back against these fears, NIYSO also provides guidance to Chechens facing abuses, particularly kidnappings. By exposing various cases and their outcomes, NIYSO aims to raise awareness of recurring patterns and operational methods.

In doing so, they have created a strategy to counter such abuses by following a set of key steps, starting with assessing the situation and its severity. NIYSO also advises to avoid immediately paying any ransom and to publicise the case by using contacts outside Chechnya or Russia to safely relay the information. Finally, they suggest applying reverse pressure on security forces by highlighting that their actions violate Russian laws.

NIYSO also offers digital security tips, regularly publishing advice to help individuals protect their personal data online. The fate of Salman Tepsurkaev, a chat moderator for the 1ADAT Telegram channel living in Russia, can explain NIYSO’s insistence on protecting personal data online.

Operating anonymously, Tepsurkaev was approached by a man using the pseudonym ‘Dervish’, who, after gaining Tepsurkaev’s trust, sent him €500 ($525) via PayPal. As his PayPal account was linked to his phone number, Chechen security forces were able to locate Tepsurkaev.

On 6 September 2020, Tepsurkaev disappeared near his workplace. The next day, his phone sent geolocation data to his family, showing he was on the grounds of the Akhmat Kadyrov police regiment in Grozny. After enduring humiliation and torture, Tepsurkaev’s death was officially announced in August 2022.

To prevent such events from happening again, NIYSO regularly warns its readers: if security forces check a phone, they will look for incriminating evidence in the photo gallery, on Telegram, WhatsApp, SMS, and even YouTube by reviewing browsing histories and channels followed. NIYSO frequently republishes its list of security tips, advising readers not to store images or materials that could raise suspicion, to avoid political discussions with strangers, and to use strong passwords for social media accounts.

These recommendations are also followed by members of the Chechen diaspora, who, even if they do not necessarily support opposition narratives, ‘clean’ their phones of anything that might seem suspicious to the authorities before visiting Chechnya.

The actions carried out abroad by different opposition movements currently have a limited impact within Chechnya. However, these movements do provoke reactions from Kadyrov’s government and attempts to discredit or silence these opponents, whether anonymous or public, often backfire. For instance, the protest against the Yangulbaev family on 2 February 2022 resulted in a significant surge in subscribers to the 1ADAT channel.

‘They [NIYSO] are doing what others are hesitant to do’, Muhammad tells OC Media. ‘Their work brings attention to what is happening back home. Without platforms like NIYSO, many of these cases might remain unnoticed’.

Among the Chechen opposition movements, NIYSO stands out for targeting the government’s official religious discourse. Through the participation of Muslim theology specialists, they challenge the narratives used by the muftiyat to justify Russia’s policies.

In addition, while other opposition movements focus on advocating their causes to international institutions, NIYSO primarily directs its efforts toward speaking directly to Chechens, offering support, and amplifying their voices to the world. By deconstructing official narratives, NIYSO seeks to prepare the population for what they believe to be an inevitable conflict in Chechnya.