On 22 April, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was met on Tiananmen Square by Chinese President Xi Jinping as Aliyev’s favourite song — ‘Homeland!’ (‘Ey Vətən!’) — played in the background. It was a message to the world that Xi was growing his club of authoritarian leaders.
In their one-on-one meeting Xi stressed that China supports Azerbaijan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and in continuing to follow a development path that suits its national conditions.
‘China is willing to carry out in-depth law enforcement and security cooperation with Azerbaijan to resolutely combat the “three evil forces” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism,’ Xi said.
China and Azerbaijan started to build a strong friendship after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War — one of the parallels for both sides has been the integrity of their borders. More concretely, this has meant, for both countries, keeping their populace under control, dismissing any respect towards human rights, and establishing a police force that operates like Orwell’s Big Brother, all while claiming their rights to sovereignty and building a safe, stable nation.
It is clear that developing ties with China will not serve to develop Azerbaijan or benefit the nation, however — it will only serve in keeping Aliyev’s regime afloat.
But how will it help to protect Aliyev and why is he making this choice to deepen relationships now?
One thing China appears to be counting on is that Russia is growing weaker every day its war in Ukraine continues — and China knows how to take advantage of a weakening global power whenever the opportunity arises. It is banking on gaining influence in the Caucasus now — through projects in all countries, such as funding Georgia’s deep-sea Anaklia Port — so that when Russia can no longer keep up its influence, China already has a hand in the game.
In turn, Azerbaijan needs to make use of China’s offers, as its state budget is highly dependent on petrol — as the world changes, it needs to look to other ways of financing.
According to a recent China Daily article, ‘China has become one of Azerbaijan’s key economic partners, with bilateral trade increasing over 43% in 2024, amounting to $2.46 billion, according to statistics from the General Administration of Customs’.
This trade is expected to continue to increase, allowing Azerbaijan an alternative source of funding to develop its agriculture and its plans for reconstruction in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan views its relations with China through the lens of the future to come. Why not stay under China’s umbrella, gaining a powerful benefactor while preparing for a time when petrol no longer determines relations.
But regardless of whatever economic cooperation China may be able to offer Azerbaijan, it is unlikely to reap tangible benefits for the average Azerbaijani. After all — as is the case with most top-down infrastructure projects in a kleptocratic autocracy like Azerbaijan — the short-term winners will be Aliyev and his clique. Contracts with Chinese businesses and the state will remain within his small circle, who will likely continue to hoard wealth off the backs of workers.
In the long run, an Azerbaijan–China alliance, even one rooted on economic ties, will surely be based on ruthless pragmatism — by both sides.
