Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on peace — so why do they seem headed for war?

In recent weeks, Azerbaijan has accused Armenia of more than a dozen ceasefire violations, which Yerevan has denied. In Azerbaijan, a TikToker was arrested for allegedly filming military positions and sharing them on social media. Azerbaijani officials and pro-government media have also increasingly alleged that Armenia is rearming and preparing for a new war in April.

Taken altogether, the steps appear to be an alarming sign of a new outbreak of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan — instigated by Baku. But unlike previous episodes of war, there are two fundamental differences in what is going on now.

The question of Nagorno-Karabakh, the primary animating force that has driven the more than 30 years of conflict, has largely been resolved in Azerbaijan’s favour. After the 2023 lightning offensive and subsequent exodus of virtually the entire population of ethnic Armenians — in theory, Azerbaijan has no more (current) grievances over Nagorno-Karabakh.

The second factor has come even more recently, in light of the historic news that Armenia and Azerbaijan had agreed on the terms of a peace treaty, after Armenia accepted Azerbaijan’s latest proposals.

With a real peace treaty seemingly closer than ever, why are all sides appearing to be preparing for another war?

According to the three analysts who spoke to OC Media — Tigran Grigoryan, the head of the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security in Yerevan, Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, and independent Azerbaijani researcher Shujaat Ahmadzada — the risks of all-out war remain low.

Nonetheless, many of the signs that predated previous outbreaks of violence have already occurred. But at the same time — fears of a new escalation are a perennial concern, and it is hard to tell when, or if, those fears will materialise into a real military conflict.

Historic steps towards peace — but is it genuine?

Earlier in March, Armenia and Azerbaijan finally agreed the terms of a peace treaty, a critical step towards ending the conflict, one that has eluded both sides — as well as mediators including Russia, the US, and various international bodies — for decades.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged that the agreement was a ‘compromise’, but said that any peace deal, particularly given the circumstances, required compromises.

Concessions made by Armenia prior to the announcement (with the understanding they would be implemented once the treaty was signed) included the removal of the EU monitoring mission along the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan, which Azerbaijan has long sought, and the dropping of all lawsuits against each other in international courts.

Certain maximalist Azerbaijani demands were also explicitly left out of the agreement. These included the issue of Soviet–era exclaves, which both sides have occupied since the dissolution of the USSR, as well the so-called ‘Zangezur corridor’, an Azerbaijani demand for control of a strip of land through Armenia to link mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan.

But just hours after news of the agreement broke, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov was already pouring cold water on the significance of the deal, stating that Baku had two ‘pre-conditions’ for Armenia before the agreement could actually be signed. These were changes to the Armenian Constitution, which Baku says contains claims to Azerbaijani territory, and the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, the body responsible for facilitating negotiations over the past few decades.

Even as the agreement began to fall apart, more concerning signs emerged.

On the same day of the announcement that the two sides had reached an agreement, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said ‘the level of trust to Armenia is close to zero’ in a speech full of grievances and conspiracy theories.

He also openly accused Armenia of ‘preparing for a new war’, reiterating past allegations that have become commonplace in pro-government media.

‘Who is pushing [Armenia] to war again?’ Aliyev asked rhetorically.

‘France and its president’.

In the week that followed, whatever signs of optimism quickly faded into a growing sense of impending war.

From 16 March to 21 March, Azerbaijan accused Armenia of violating the ceasefire at least 13 times, which Armenia repeatedly denied.

Yerevan then appeared to change tactics, taking the dispute over the alleged ceasefire violations into the public, first by reiterating offers to investigate the claims, including by a joint commission.

Pashinyan’s office then explicitly stated it had received no evidence or substantiation of Azerbaijan’s claims, a sentiment that was echoed by the EU monitoring mission.

After Azerbaijani claims continued, Pashinyan took further steps, taking to X to remind the public that the draft treaty had already been agreed upon, and saying his ‘instruction to the Ministry of Defence of Armenia is clear: do not commit any violation of the ceasefire regime. Armenia is heading for peace, not war’.

Despite these efforts, Azerbaijan’s information war continued unabated, with pro-government media outlets posting articles with headlines like ‘One step forward, two steps back: Yerevan opts for escalation’, ‘Shelling Azerbaijani border positions: Armenia plays with fire’, and ‘Armenia’s military and psychological provocations: Yerevan demonstrates its reluctance for peace’.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan reportedly arrested a TikToker for allegedly filming the movement of military columns — a practice that predated the beginning of past military offensives. Moreover, there has been an accompanying campaign on Azerbaijani social media to strongly urge the public not to take photos of any military equipment.

Will there be a new outbreak of violence?

In light of all these factors, many, particularly in Armenia, fear that a new military escalation by Azerbaijan is in the cards.

Experts, however, are not so sure.

One of the biggest factors that made those who spoke to OC Media hesitant about the possibility of a new war was that it is simply difficult to see what Azerbaijan would gain by using military force.

Armenia has already been willing to grant significant concessions, and one of the main remaining issues — changing the constitution — is a complicated process that Yerevan cannot unilaterally force, something that Baku is aware of.

While Azerbaijan would like to have access to the Zangezur corridor, it is not immediately clear that it is a sufficiently critical issue to justify a military intervention, which has been corroborated by Baku’s own statements on the matter.

Moreover, an operation on the level of seizing and holding the Zangezur corridor, or the wider Syunik Province, considering Azerbaijan’s more expansionist rhetoric, would require sustained military presence. It also would necessitate coordination, and likely approval, from Moscow, considering that Russian border guards are still stationed at Armenia’s border with Turkey and Iran. This would come at a time in which relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have taken a significant blow following the December crash of the Azerbaijan Airlines jet, which Baku has blamed on Russian air defence missiles.

An operation that would be aimed at seizing territory for the Zangezur corridor would be the ‘worst-case scenario’, Ahmadzada told OC Media.

As a result, a smaller-level escalation does remain a more likely possibility, Grigoryan, de Waal, and Ahmadzada concurred.

Such a scenario could include a ‘preemptive’ strike on a military installation at the border, de Waal said, possibly as a message aimed at France, which Baku sees as the main external military supporter of Armenia.

While the amount of military support France has provided Armenia is ‘exaggerated’, the type of operation could serve as a ‘warning’, de Waal told OC Media.

Nonetheless, he said that the most likely scenario that includes direct military force would still be something that complements Baku’s ‘coercive diplomacy’.

‘You have a little military operation [...] and then you sort of coerce the Armenians into accepting a deal’, de Waal said.

According to Grigoryan, although a significant escalation remains unlikely, ‘maintaining the rhetoric of conflict helps create leverage and keeps Armenia under constant pressure’.

What would the West do?

The unpredictable international response, particularly from the West, is one of the primary reasons why de Waal said a major escalation is unlikely.

Baku has spent diplomatic effort to demonstrate to Washington that it is a reliable partner and intermediary, including with Moscow. In addition, a top US official recently traveled to Azerbaijan for high-level talks. While the details are unknown, many have speculated that they could have been connected to the growing three-way alliance between the US, Israel, and Azerbaijan.

There is also a Christian nationalist leaning in the administration of US President Donald Trump, de Waal said, which has previously been expressed by members of his inner circle in connection to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict.

While Trump was president during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and did relatively little to get involved, his approach to the presidency this time around — concerning all issues — is clearly much different.

‘Everyone is trying to figure out what the US position is going to be on the Caucasus, if any, so this would not be a good time to do anything provocative’, de Waal said.

In regards to the response from the EU and the rest of the international community, it would depend on the scale of the intervention, Grigoryan said.

‘If Azerbaijan were to occupy significant parts of Armenia, it would likely face at least some degree of international isolation — potentially including targeted sanctions against officials and UN Security Council resolutions. However, direct military intervention is highly unlikely’, he told OC Media.

Although Baku may be calculating that the EU’s new-found energy dependence on Azerbaijan could limit its punitive response, there are limits, Grigoryan said.

‘The EU’s response is complicated by the fact that several member states are energy-dependent on Azerbaijan, maintain strategic partnerships with Baku, and wield veto power in EU decision-making. However, if Azerbaijan were to cross the red line by launching a large-scale attack on Armenia, even those countries might struggle — or be unwilling — to block potential EU measures against Baku’.

All these factors will likely constrain the more maximalist possible moves from Azerbaijan, the three analysts told OC Media.

An operation targeted at securing the Zangezur corridor, which would inherently entail the occupation of Armenian territory, is the ‘riskiest option — not only in terms of military-operational risks (high casualties, high cost) but also potential economic and political risks for Azerbaijan, not to mention a potential intervention from Iran’, Ahmadzada said.

That being said, Ahmadzada added that ‘one should not rule out small to mid scale border skirmishes that could happen along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. There exists a sort of “routine ceasefire violations” that [the] Armenian and Azerbaijani public got used to — less nowadays, more in the past’.

But armed conflicts, even ones of a limited nature, rarely go as planned. If an escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan occurs, it could have unpredictable consequences.

‘One never knows when a “[ceasefire] violation” [has] turned into a “battle”’, Ahmadzada told OC Media.

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OC MediaArshaluys Barseghyan